On November 3rd, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its decision in Reyes v. People, 07SC658. In a 4-3 decision, the majority held that a prisoner effectively waived the protections of the anti-shuttling provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers by asking to be returned to federal custody before the state charges pending against him were completely resolved. The Court's decision is striking for its expansive concept of waiver in this context: the prisoner's single request to be returned to federal custody not only waived the protection of the anti-shuttling provision for all future transfers, but it also served to retroactively bar the prisoner from invoking the anti-shuttling provision with respect to an earlier, unrequested transfer that was clearly in violation of the anti-shuttling provision. This holding is in considerable tension with the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001). In that case, Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous court, required strict adherence to the requirements of the anti-shuttling provision. The Court held that the provision required the dismissal of all charges against a prisoner whose federal imprisonment "was interrupted briefly -- for a single day -- during which time he was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraignment and then returned immediately to his original place of imprisonment." The Court emphasized that the plain language of the provision required dismissal of charges when the receiving jurisdiction violated its terms.
As I read the two cases, the critical distinction between them is the nature of the underlying state and federal crimes. In Bozeman, the charges were non-violent -- the prisoner was imprisoned for federal drug crimes and the state then filed a detainer against him in order to resolve outstanding firearms charges. In contrast, the charges in Reyes stemmed from the prisoner's involvement in a brutal home invasion. The majority opinion pointedly notes that "[e]vidence indicated that the occupants of the home were beaten and terrorized, and their ten-year-old daughter was raped and sodomized by Reyes." Ultimately, Reyes was convicted in state court of first degree kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, sexual assault on a child, first degree burglary, aggravated robbery, second degree sexual assault on a child, felony menacing, and third degree assault. This was a vicious crime and the majority went to great lengths to ensure that the Reyes was not able to escape accountability by virtue of strict adherence to the anti-shuttling provision. In light of the extremely small chance that this case will be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, it is likely that this holding will stand. It will be interesting to see if it is the beginning of an effort by the states to push back against the Supreme Court's rigid jurisprudence in this area, or if it merely ends up as an isolated break with the general rule.
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