The plaintiffs in Robbins v. State of Oklahoma, No. 07-7021 brought suit against various individuals and governmental entities after their daughter was murdered by a day care provider. (Technically, she was ‘allegedly murdered’ as it appears from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion that the charge of first degree murder is still pending). The Oklahoma Department of Human Services allegedly told the plaintiffs that the day care center where the daughter was murdered was the only day care that DHS would pay for their daughter to attend.
The case was before the Tenth Circuit on the appeal of three defendants (the Director of the Oklahoma DHS and two DHS social workers) from the denial of their motion to dismiss. On appeal, the court considered the complaint under the standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The court observed that the standard set forth in Twombly is “less than pellucid.” It held, however, that “As best we understand it . . . [Twombly] seeks to find a middle ground between ‘heightened fact pleading’ . . . and allowing complaints that are no more than ‘labels or conclusions’ . . .”. The court held that, under Twombly, if the scope of the allegations is so general as to encompass “a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent” then the complaint fails to plead a cause of action. The court further held that the degree of specificity required depended on the context and the nature of the cause of action alleged.
Applying Twombly to the complaint in Robbins, the court held that due process count of the complaint failed to state a claim because it failed to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant and thus failed to provide them with adequate notice of the claims against them. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to pled facts sufficient to state a claim of liability under a theory of danger creation. The court held that “[g]iven the complaint’s use of either the collative term “Defendants” or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.” The court similarly rejected an equal protection claim and remanded the case for dismissal without prejudice.
I haven *not* read the opinion but, should not the Court have remanded back with the possibility of amendment consistent with Erickson v. Pardus? Or did "dismissed with prejudice" in this instance mean that plaintiffs are granted leave to refile w/ pymnt of docket fee after curing the pleading defects?
Posted by: peteSmith | March 24, 2008 at 05:09 PM